



**Forced Migration Trends in Latin America and the Caribbean**

Context report - First semester 2023



## Forced migration trends in Latin America and the Caribbean Context- First semester 2023

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## Introduction

Migration has always been rooted in Latin America and the Caribbean history as a result of the traditional internal armed conflicts in Central American, South American, and Caribbean countries or democratic crises. However, migration processes have intensified, and their causes have diversified, and this has been a challenge for the international protection schemes implemented by States and for the host communities capacities when trying to respond adequately and with a rights-based approach to refugees, migrants, and internally displaced persons; creating “protection gaps.”

According to UNHCR's 2022 Mid-Year Trends analyses, it is estimated that the Americas holds 19.9 million people seeking asylum or refuge, or are refugees, internally displaced persons, stateless persons, as well as other people in need of international protection.

From this perspective, this document seeks to present regional trends in migratory processes (based on territorial approaches in Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Peru), emphasizing the **risks on migratory pathways, migration management policies and their emphasis on the militarization, securitization and externalization of border controls, the gray areas in protection measures, the migratory processes of indigenous communities and, finally, the reconciliation and hospitality opportunities developed by that migrant and reception communities.**

## **1 People and communities made invisible in the region during forced displacement**

In the region, there are various groups that have been forcibly displaced that require comprehensive protection. This section seeks to highlight populations and nationalities in forced displacement conditions that are rarely ever mentioned. It is worth noting that **one of the biggest challenges in the region is to gather updated data and statistics on people who have been forcibly displaced**, this is why there is no clarity about the number of people who transit or reside in the countries, and why the development of concrete protection actions towards minority or invisible populations becomes a challenge.

One of the best-known migratory flows currently is that of **Venezuelans**. It is estimated that -as of March of this year- **6,095,464 people** in the region are seeking asylum or any kind of immigration regularization mechanism so to establish themselves in the region (R4V, 2023). This population is highly diverse, and includes people with disabilities. In Mexico it was notorious finding Venezuelan asylum seekers **with hearing and speech disabilities** who require translation into Venezuelan sign language in order to communicate with authorities and/or civil society organizations, making the guarantee and defense of their rights arduous.

**Haitians are one of the invisible populations in the region.** Although they have been on the move for more than 10 years, there is no clear data on the total number of people in the area. An information identification exercise - carried out by JRS LAC using different government sources - considers there is an estimate of **1.7 million** Haitians migrating in the region: They can be found **traveling north from countries where they resided for 10 years, having mixed families with minors of Chilean, Argentine or Brazilian origin.**

On the other hand, the number of **Ecuadorians who are transiting to the United States and Chile** has been on the rise. Since 2020, 200,200 Ecuadorian people who arrived at the southern border of the United States have been detained (Plan V Editorial Team, 2023), depicting an increase in a migratory flow whose causes and travel conditions are mostly unknown. In Mexico, a significant group of Ecuadorians has been identified; they arrived by air to Cancun and are traveling by land to Ciudad Juárez. The mobility of **Central American populations from El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua** who are forced to migrate due to violence, massive human rights violations committed by their governments and persecutions, is hardly mentioned.

Additionally, there are **extracontinental populations seeking to reach the United States, that cross** Latin America and the Caribbean to reach their destination. People who come from the **Africa** have been identified<sup>1</sup>: when cross-referencing information from various government sources, it is noted that, in recent years, there are 2.9 million

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<sup>1</sup>More information in: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/migracion-africana-continente-americano>

Africans migrating in the region. It has also been possible to detect the presence of people from **Afghanistan**<sup>2</sup>, **Ukraine**<sup>3</sup> and **China**<sup>4</sup>, among other nationalities, about which there are no statistics. In both Mexico and Colombia, it was highlighted that the greatest challenge with these populations is the **language barrier**, since a large part of them are non-Spanish speakers.

In the eastern part of Venezuela, as the presence of people from different nationalities such as **Republic of Ghana, Cameroon, and Nigeria**, has increased, they arrived from Trinidad and Tobago, with the purpose of traveling through the country towards Colombia, Panama -taking the route that crosses the dangerous rainforest of El Darién-, passing through the Central American countries and arrive to the United States.

On the other hand, it is necessary to point out that **the violence contexts within the countries**, associated to drug trafficking, internal armed conflict, environmental conflicts, disputes between criminal organizations, among others, maintain and may increase the internal forced displacement flows and in some cases they become situations that require international protection. **Colombia is one of the few countries that has specialized institutions to respond to this population**; thus, there is no clear data on the number of internally displaced people in other countries. In Mexico, efforts are being made to create laws to protect this population, however, as of today the State does not acknowledge these realities, leaving an estimate 300,000 people unprotected, according to data from non-governmental organizations.

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**In Colombia, an increase in human trafficking has been noted**, Nonetheless accessing information about the current situation is still arduous, given the under-reporting of cases and the ineffective response by the State. Similarly, **Peru has also had an increase in human trafficking**, there have been reports that human trafficking networks such as the Tren de Aragua, make **migrant women victims of sexual exploitation**. This situation occurs throughout the region.

Another group that is traveling through the regional territory and is barely mentioned, are the **unaccompanied girls, boys and adolescents** who have left their countries fleeing violence, looking for job opportunities to support their family that remains in the country of origin, or seeking international protection in another country. Details about this population will be discussed later.

A different group that has been made invisible is the **pendulum** population, that -lives in border territories- with a **high level of mobility between countries**. After the borders between Colombia and Venezuela, as well as the borders Peru and Ecuador were opened, **the health, education and/or work needs**, of people who oscillate between countries were compromised **given the lack of comprehensive protection measures to access their rights**. In both cases, there are no documents that formalize and protect the pendulum movement of people.

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<sup>2</sup> More information in: : <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/21/world/americas/darien-gap-afghan-migration.html?campaign>

<sup>3</sup> More information at: <https://www.france24.com/es/programas/aqu%C3%AD-am%C3%A9rica/20220412-la-ruta-migratoria-de-los-refugiados-de-Ucrania-a-trav%C3%A9s-de-M%C3%A9xico>

<sup>4</sup> More information at: <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-64070549>

<sup>5</sup> More information at: <https://www.france24.com/es/programas/aqu%C3%AD-am%C3%A9rica/20220412-la-ruta-migratoria-de-los-refugiados-de-Ucrania-a-trav%C3%A9s-de-M%C3%A9xico>

<sup>6</sup> The reopening of borders between Colombia and Venezuela occurs due to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. The reopening of borders between Peru and Ecuador occurs after the COVID-19 pandemic.

In some cases, the migrant and refugee population located on the border of Ecuador and Peru, also part of this pendulum dynamic; decide to move across borders in order to seek humanitarian assistance such as kits, food cards and financial assistance, to which they no longer have access in area where they live, thus **they continue living in extreme vulnerability conditions.**

Finally, another invisible group, **the LGBTIQ+ community**, is subject to **different kinds of violence** such as discrimination, xenophobia, physical violence, psychological violence, among others, in their countries of origin, as well as in transit and destination countries. In Ecuador, there is still a strong discrimination against this community which has given way to **marginalization and precariousness, making comprehensive protection for access to rights strenuous.** The impact of this violence forces this community to continue their transit or leave their country and seek asylum in other countries where they believe they may have more guarantees.

In Peru being a Venezuelan LGBTIQ+ migrant and refugee, can create an **additional barrier to the fulfillment of personal development goals and expectations**, especially in a country with significant gaps regarding legislative protection and access to rights (IOM, 2020).

According to the study carried out by the International Organization for Migration - IOM on Venezuelan people in Lima, Arequipa, and La Libertad titled "Leaving home to return to the closet", people state that on the migratory route they receive offensive comments regarding their sexual orientation and/or gender identity. **Trans people needed to hide their gender identity to avoid being raped when crossing borders between countries.** In Peru, xenophobia has manifested itself during the search for housing by LGBTIQ+ people: when conducting interviews, they reported having experienced situations of discrimination, intimidating treatment, and abuse of power by leaseholders.

Some people indicated that they had been evicted from their homes because of their LGBTIQ+ nature, a situation that led them to **hide their sexual orientation or gender identity when renting a room**, a situation that is similar to what was identified at the borders.

The document states that **most people did not have access to health insurance**, and medical care depended on the financial resources available at the time. The majority decided to self-medicate or followed treatments prescribed in Venezuela. Internal displacement **had effects on the mental health of LGBTIQ+ people causing episodes of depression and anxiety.**

LGBTIQ+ migrants reported difficulties in accessing job opportunities due to their nationality and, in some cases, because they were part of LGBTIQ+ communities. The jobs in which LGBTIQ+ Venezuelan migrants worked were mostly informal and with a salary that would not cover their needs.

Furthermore, **Peruvian press contributes to the building of a stereotype about Venezuelan people living in the country**, representing them as dangerous or associating them with crime, prostitution, and diseases such as HIV; driving rejection by the host community towards migrants from Venezuela.

## 2 Militarization and securitization policies

Given the diverse realities experienced by refugees, migrants, and internally displaced people in the region, in June 2022 in the Americas Summit, 20 countries on the continent signed the Los Angeles Declaration<sup>7</sup> in order to implement regional agreements for cooperation and migration management. Nonetheless, migration policies have been based on migration management strategies that move away from comprehensive protection and a human rights-based approach; these impact people in a situation of forced displacement, as well as the transit and host communities.

**Immigration policies that are based on securitization and militarization approaches** follow the premise that refugees, migrants and internally displaced persons are a threat to the security of the State, therefore, actions for the “care” of the population can be characterized by the presence of public force, administrative sanctions for the migrant population, requirements for a high number of documents to regularize their immigration status (valid passport, criminal record, etc.), among other measures.

An example of this is the **militarization of Tacna (Peru) and Arica (Chile) on April 13, 2023**, with the intention of stopping the passing of migrants and refugees, this measure was justified by the increase in crime, which governments blamed the migrants for, causing a humanitarian crisis on the border<sup>8</sup>. The Peruvian Ministry of Defense ordered that the Armed Forces support the National Police of Peru, “as sought in the points deemed relevant, and within the framework of the constitutional order, in accordance with the provisions of the declaration of the State of Emergency”.

At the moment, **there are 196 members of the Peruvian Army and the Peruvian Air Force (FAP) in this border**, which were allocated in a total of **12 observation posts**, from post<sup>9</sup> No. 1 to No. 15, 12.5 km from the border, where they control the presence of undocumented migrants who are on the Concordia line. In addition to that, **on April 26, the Peruvian State declared a state of emergency in the border areas** of the departments of Tumbes, Piura, Cajamarca, Amazonas, Loreto, Madre de Dios, and Tacna given the migratory crisis in the country, which **has translated into a practice of migration management by armed forces, that has generated greater violations to the rights of this population**.

In the case of **Ecuadorians**, the Mexican government increased the price of the tourist visa, established the requirement for a letter of invitation from a person living in Mexico and a commitment to return to Ecuador<sup>10</sup>. In the case of **Haitians**, they require a visa to enter and transit all countries in the Americas region. For **Cubans**, only Costa Rica and some Caribbean countries do not require visas. For **Venezuelans**, the visa requirement has increased over the years in countries in the region, such as Peru, Ecuador, and Chile<sup>11</sup>.

<sup>7</sup> More information at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/la-declaracion-de-los-angeles-podria-representar-un-gran-paso-para-la-cooperacion-migratoria-real-en-las-americas#:~:text=The%20Declaraci%C3%B3n%20of%20Los%20%C3%81ngeles%20was%20signed%20on%2010%20of,Guyana%20also%C3%A9n%20firm%C3%B3%20m%C3%A1s%20afternoon.>

<sup>8</sup> More information at: [https://www.r4v.info/sites/default/files/2023-05/20230508\\_GTRM\\_Informe\\_Tacna.pdf](https://www.r4v.info/sites/default/files/2023-05/20230508_GTRM_Informe_Tacna.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> The milestone is a geographic demarcation that is used to establish critical points on the border between countries.

<sup>10</sup> More information at: <https://www.primicias.ec/noticias/politica/mexico-mantiene-requisito-visa-ecuatorianos/>

<sup>11</sup> More information at: <https://www.migrationbrief.com/p/americas-migration-brief-washington>

Furthermore, in **Mexico** the increase in securitization has been the result of formal and informal agreements between the Mexican government and the United States, which translate into **border control externalization** practices. This is seen in the increase in immigration and national guard checkpoints where a high number of migrants and refugees pass through, such as in Tapachula, Monterrey, Ciudad Juárez, among others. It is important to mention that **the National Guard and the National Immigration Institute, which are part of immigration management, despite being a civil force, have military commanders in their ranks who have promoted military training, thus fostering a military based immigration management practice.**

**The Government of Mexico implemented the Multiple Migration Form (FMM)** several years ago, a document that enables migrants to transit regularly; however, there have been cases where immigration or national guard officers have destroyed **the documents of people who are in transit to the north of Mexico**, making transit through the country difficult.

Additionally, it has been recorded that, since the end of Article 42 and the restart of Article 8 in the United States, the delivery of FMM for migrants has decreased, increasing the **use of irregular migratory** routes through Mexico, which adds to the **increase in detentions** by the national guard or immigration, **of the migratory flows** especially those who go to the north of Mexico.

In the **Colombian case**, the government has not considered forced displacement a national security issue. On the contrary, it has focused on topics associated with integration and states the “nonexistence of a migration crisis.” However, the new measures issued by the Colombian and American governments, such as the “Safe Mobility Points” and the “Regional Processing Centers,” open the door to **a potential security-based migration management approach.**

Considering the above, although there are no migration policies that expressly view migration from a “national security” approach, it has been noted that **local governments use of migration discourses associated with criminalization, increase the levels of xenophobia in local contexts.** With the beginning of local political campaigns, there is a trend in political speeches to depict migrants as criminals, which has generated hostile environments, as well as actions such as patrolling to detain migrants, among other discriminatory practices.

Regarding the Venezuelan context, after almost seven years of closed borders, on January 1, 2023, the Colombian-Venezuelan borders were opened as part of a key element in improving relations between the two nations that share a border of more than 2,200 kilometers.

In the **Paraguachón border crossing, in western Venezuela**, there are Citizen Care Points (PAC) managed by members of the national security (Bolivarian National Guard and Police) with the purpose of guaranteeing and providing control in the migration processes experienced in “La Raya.” However, and despite the free movement that people have in the only authorized border crossing to the capital of the state of Zulia, there are more than ten PACs where **complaints regarding abuse of authority, mistreatment, and improper retention of personal belongings** of migrants by security officers have been registered.



Now, with regards to Ecuador, on its northern border there is free entry through the Rumichaca bridge and there is no military presence; however, in the South Control of the city of Tulcán, **there are record of how Immigration Police implement arbitrary documents control processes, abuse their authority and ask for money in exchange for allowing migrants to continue their journey to the interior of the country.**

Despite the tightening of migration policies at the South American level and the militarization of border areas in several countries of the region, in Ecuador a **humanitarian process for immigration regularization through Presidential Decree No. 436**<sup>12</sup> has been implemented. This decree allows people who have entered formally to seek a VIRTE visa (Exceptional Temporary Residence Visa for Venezuelans), immigration amnesty, and a temporary identification for the duration of the visa. But not all people who are in Ecuadorian territory have the possibility of applying and accessing this possibility.

It should be mentioned that Ecuador is experiencing a **period of insecurity** due to the increase in acts of violence and crime associated with drug trafficking. This has deepened the xenophobia contexts, especially against the Venezuelan and Colombian population. Faced with this, the Government has declared a State of Exception in some Provinces, for example, in the province of Esmeraldas. All these factors have led to the **population in need of International Protection to move to other cities to protect themselves, in some cases, they are beginning to abandon their regularization processes in Ecuador to go to the United States.**

In summary, there is a **hardening and restriction of immigration management through securitization and militarization actions** in the region's migration policies, which are related to the **immigration policies of the United States, that has generated border control externalization actions for migration management.** Regarding this, from JRS LAC, RJM LAC and partner organizations issued a statement alerting about the risks of these approaches and practices: <https://lac.jrs.net/es/noticias/alertas-sobre-la-gestion-migratoria-y-la-proteccion-en-las-americas-comunicado/>

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<sup>12</sup>Due to the recent Ecuadorian constitutional process called "Crossed Death", in the context of the impeachment trial of President Guillermo Lasso that was being carried out in the National Assembly, with the consequent call for early elections for both the Presidency and the Assembly, it is likely that there will be impacts on the execution of this presidential decree, with effects on the Venezuelan population that had already taken administrative steps in this regard.



## Risks on migratory routes in Latin America and the Caribbean

As noted in the previous sections, there is a diversity of refugee, migrant and internally displaced populations in the region that move to the north and south of the continent, who face a restrictive and securitist response from governments. In this context, a series of risks have been identified in the migratory routes that people take, given the challenges faced when entering through regular routes.

- **Physical violence:** In the Darién Gap, acts of violence against people who are crossing the rainforest have been reported, from assaults, beatings to homicides<sup>13</sup>. On the northern border of Ecuador, especially in Esmeraldas, attacks on women, girls, boys, adolescents, and men have been recorded. These people are beaten and tortured by active-duty members of the army and armed groups that are on the border.
- **Kidnappings:** In Mexico, cases of migrants who are victims of kidnapping have increased; recently, the case of 49 people of Haitian, Cuban, Honduran, Salvadoran and Brazilian nationality who suffered this violence in the State of Chiapas by Mexican cartels became known<sup>14</sup>.
- **Human trafficking:** It has been reported that migrant women and girls from Venezuela are victims of human trafficking and sexual exploitation by the criminal gang Tren de Aragua; these cases have been found in countries such as Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile. In Peru, as of June 2022, 59% of the registered trafficking and smuggling victims were Venezuelan women and adolescents, a figure that exceeded the figure registered in 2019 of 29%. At the same time, 63% of the Venezuelan population are offered false job offers, 33% of children are exposed to begging, and 14% of people (women) are forced to provide sexual services. In the last quarter of 2022, 23% were forced to seek income by begging or seeking money on the streets and 17% accepted jobs in illegal and/or socially degrading economies (GTRM, 2023).

In Venezuela, it has been identified that - in the eastern states of the country - groups that were dedicated to human trafficking to Trinidad and Tobago have been dismantled, they charged from 200 USD with the false promise of relocating them to the island and get a formal job. The same situation is experienced in the State of Falcón, in the northwest of the country, where traffickers identify people with the false promise of working in the “ABC Islands” (Aruba, Bonaire and Curacao) but who end up in abuse, torture and slavery situations.

<sup>13</sup> More information at: <https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2023/04/15/region-del-darien-ruta-migratorias-mas-peligrosas-del-sueño-americano-trax/>

<sup>14</sup> More information at: <https://www.latimes.com/espanol/mexico/articulo/2023-05-18/mexico-halla-49-migrantes-que-habian-sido-secuestrados-de-autobus>

- **Migrant smuggling:** This risk has manifested itself in cases in which, due to border security, as well as their closure, has had an impact on the options that people in forced displacement situations have to move between countries, keeping in mind that there are borders - such as the Colombian-Venezuelan and Colombian-Ecuadorian borders - where organized armed groups have taken control of the trails and “green routes” and decide which migrants can or cannot cross the border and what price are they charged.

There are also known cases at the Tumbes and Tacna border crossings where - as of February 2022, when the borders were reopened - it was noted that between 20% and 29% of the migrants who entered Peru through Tumbes had to make payments (on average 6 USD) to cross the border; likewise, 4% of people stated that they had made a similar payment when entering through Tacna. In the Ecuadorian case, it has been reported that migrants, refugees, and internally displaced people seeking to cross borders are exposed to different illegal activities such as: “mules”, prostitution, drug cultivation, hitmen, and common crime. On the other hand, reprehensible events have occurred where people have died due to the journey conditions related to illicit migrant smuggling. One of the most recent reports was that of 50 people who died in a trailer in San Antonio, Texas<sup>15</sup>, this situation that continues to increase in the inland, riverine and maritime routes in the region.

- **Gender-Based Violence or sexual violence:** Cases continue to be reported in the Darién Gap, where migrant, refugee and internally displaced women and girls have been victims of rape and sexual violence<sup>16</sup>. In the border area of Ciudad Juárez in Mexico, a series of interviews were carried out with - migrants, internally displaced persons, and refugees - where 60% of them stated that they had been victims of sexual violence on their migratory route. When reviewing what is happening in Ecuador, there is evidence of high levels of gender-based violence (GBV) in the northern border, where there is little presence of authorities guarding the border. Furthermore, there is an under-recording of the facts since people prefer not to file complaints about threats from their perpetrators.

However, in Peru, the refugee and migrant population from Venezuela in the country continues to be at risk of GBV. If in 2021 the Women's Emergency Centers (CEM) served 2,025 Venezuelan people (66% more than the cases treated in 2020), as of July 2022, 1,350 cases were treated (GTRM, 2023). According to the survey directed at the Venezuelan Population 2022, while physical abuse was carried out by the spouse or partner (41% of cases), psychological violence was carried out by a stranger (39% of cases). It is important to point out that in Mexico there is an alarming situation, since it has been identified that migrant women who experience GBV in the country do not receive adequate access to justice (their claims are not received by the Attorney General's Office of the Republic), this generates an under-registration of cases and there are no follow-up and protection actions for victims.

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<sup>15</sup> More information at: <https://elpais.com/internacional/2022-06-28/hallados-al-menos-40-migrantes-muertos-en-un-trailer-en-san-antonio.html>

<sup>16</sup> More information at: <https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20230215-ser-mujer-en-el-tap%C3%B3n-del-dari%C3%A9n-complaints-of-sexual-violence-point-to-the-panama-authorities%C3%B1as>

- **Forced disappearance:** Cases of forced disappearances during migratory transit persist, which lack the necessary follow-up, evidenced by the under-reporting of these cases because the families who report are not in the country of the facts; this has caused civil society organizations to create networks that promote the search in the territories of the region<sup>17</sup>. Regarding what is happening in Ecuador, it has been detailed that in the Nariño-Tumaco border (Colombia) and San Lorenzo (Ecuador) disappearances of people have been recorded, especially adolescents.
- **Institutional violence:** : In Mexico, cases of violence by public officers towards migrants, refugees and internally displaced people have been identified, who claim to have received inhuman and degrading treatment. An example of this has been the treatment migrants and refugees received at Ciudad Juárez's immigration transit station, which ended with the death of 40 of them and others were injured<sup>18</sup>.
- **Forced recruitment:** Throughout the region, there have been cases in which criminal groups, as well as organized armed groups, are recruiting girls, boys, and adolescents, especially unaccompanied ones, to carry out tasks related to scraping coca leaves in the Colombian-Venezuelan border. In Colombia, the escalation of violence and armed conflict in areas and departments such as Norte de Santander, Magdalena Medio, Nariño, and Valle del Cauca has generated an increase in recruitment of nationals and foreigners in precarious conditions.

The situations described above make visible scenarios of **double or multiple affectation** which means that refugees, migrants, and internally displaced people are **victims of various violences not only on their departure but also during their transit and destination**, depicting a complex panorama that requires intersectoral and intersectional actions, hospitality, and reconciliation to guarantee its comprehensive protection. In the case of Colombia, as the armed conflict continues, migrants and refugees are affected by these scenarios of violence. In addition, the State has not established clear routes for their protection and guarantee of rights when these cases occur; an example of this is that those people who have an irregular immigration status are not allowed to register in the Single Registry of Victims

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<sup>17</sup> More information at: <https://www.redjesuitaconmigranteslac.org/post/desaparecidos-impunidad-y-revictimizaci%C3%B3n-in-the-horizon-of-migration%C3%B3n-in-m%C3%A9xico>

<sup>18</sup> More information at: <https://www.wola.org/es/events/incendio-ciudad-juarez-politica-migratoria/>

## 4 Gray areas in international protection, immigration regularization and government response

Based on the risks of migratory routes and the implementation of migration management policies based on securitization approaches, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have implemented **various strategies for the temporary regularization of migration that have left aside the obligations of States regarding international protection**. In the case of Colombia, it has been called Temporary Protection Permit; in Ecuador, the “Migration Amnesty” was signed; in Peru it has been called Temporary Permanence Card (CPP), among others.

Although this has been an advance for the region, it is important to highlight the **risks and gaps that these processes have brought for the migrant, refugee, and internally displaced population**. Among them, it is worth highlighting:

- The regularization processes have been focused on the Venezuelan migrant population, leaving aside other migratory profiles in the region such as that of Haitians, Cubans, and the growing population from Ecuador;
- Regularization strategies have weakened the Refugee system of the countries in the region, - to continue with the migration regularization processes - which requires waiving international protection;
- Immigration regularization has also excluded migrants due to the conditions established by the States, such as a deadline from the moment when they entered the country, documents such as a passport, or visa - which are difficult for migrants -, high costs for access, among others (IDB, 2023) .

Regarding the International Protection System in the region, 16 States have included the definition of “Refuge” adopted by the Cartagena Declaration, expanding the grounds of the Geneva Convention in the assessment of Refugee applications. However, it has been identified that people who seek refuge in countries in the region experience legal, temporal, political and social obstacles that do not allow international protection to be an accessible tool for the guarantee and protection of rights.

In Venezuela, it is necessary to highlight that there is a known case of two people of Colombian nationality who arrived in Venezuela fleeing a persecution in the Republic of Colombia, each one had a well-founded fear of returning to the country because their lives were in danger. At first they expressed the impossibility of staying in Venezuela, since the reasons why they fled Colombia were also present in part of the Venezuelan territory - irregular armed groups - so the goal was to cross into Brazil.

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<sup>19</sup> More information at: <https://blogs.iadb.org/migracion/es/regularizacion-migratoria-desafios-y-oportunidades-para-la-inclusion-de-migrantes/>

However, after evaluating the options with advice from several organizations, they preferred to stay in Venezuela, since moving from the state of Zulia to the state of Bolívar implied a greater risk. When trying to access the National Commission for Refugees (CONARE) to apply for refugee status, **they received a denial because, according to the institution, the process was not performed in the scheduled time and, therefore, they "lost" their right to it.** This justification is not established within the Organic Law on Refugees and Asylums (LORRAA) and CONARE has used it in repeated cases, which constitutes a violation of human rights.

In Ecuador, the **Cartagena Declaration** a regional protection instrument, adopted to provide a pragmatic humanitarian response to mass movements of people fleeing conflict and massive human rights violations. Based on this principle, Ecuador adopts it in the Organic Law of Human Mobility of 2017 in Art. 98 numeral 2:

Has fled or is unable to return to their country because their life, safety or freedom has been threatened by widespread violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order and have not can benefit from the protection of his country of nationality or habitual residence. The recognition of refugee status has a declarative, civil, humanitarian, apolitical nature and confers a status of international protection on the person.

In the country, the **Venezuelans** which do not fulfill the requirements of the 1951 Geneva Convention do not have international protection. However, they fall into the international protection profile as **applicants based on the Cartagena Declaration, for a given time:** despite this, there is a large number of Venezuelans who have left their country due to threats from state agents or armed groups, reason why they cannot return to Venezuela; however, the Commission has denied the Refugee status in Ecuador.

The Ecuadorian State created, through Decree 436, the **Extraordinary Immigration Regularization Visa for citizens of Venezuelan nationality** who entered through regular ways and who for economic reasons have not been able to obtain a temporary visa. The objective is to provide an opportunity for regularization and -in this way- have opportunities for a more dignified life. Although this decree has focused on people of Venezuelan nationality, it is expected that in the future it may cover other nationalities.

Regarding international protection and regularization in **Colombia, the people who usually remain unprotected are those who come from a second country and arrive seeking protection.** Currently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia includes the Cartagena Declaration within the definition of a refugee.



# PROCEDIMIENTO DE DETERMINACIÓN DE LA CONDICIÓN DE REFUGIADO



DEBES TENER EN CUENTA LO SIGUIENTE:



## ¿QUÉ ES EL REFUGIO?

Es una figura de protección internacional para los extranjeros que no pueden acogerse a la protección de su país de origen.

## ¿A QUIÉNES SE CONSIDERAN REFUGIADOS?

Extranjeros cuya situación se inscribe en alguna de las tres cláusulas de inclusión contenidas en la definición de refugiado. Puedes ver las definiciones [aquí](#).

## ¿CÓMO PUEDO SOLICITAR REFUGIO EN COLOMBIA?

- Debes diligenciar este [formulario denominado DP-FO-273](#) y en caso de tener beneficiarios, debes llenar este [formulario denominado DP-FO-274](#)
- Recuerda: El proceso lo debes hacer únicamente por medio electrónico y enviarlo solamente al correo [solicitudesentramite@cancilleria.gov.co](mailto:solicitudesentramite@cancilleria.gov.co)
- Importante: los Formularios deben ser diligenciados en su totalidad. El/los formularios y sus anexos deben enviarse en formato PDF. Tener en cuenta la lista de anexos del apartado número 8 del formulario DP-FO-273.

## ¿QUÉ NORMAS RIGEN EN NUESTRO PAÍS EL PROCEDIMIENTO DE DETERMINACIÓN DE LA CONDICIÓN DE REFUGIADO?

- Convención sobre el Estatuto de los Refugiados de 1951 (ratificada en 1961)
- Protocolo sobre el Estatuto de Refugiado (1967)
- Declaración de Cartagena sobre Refugiados (1984)
- Ley 2136 de 2021
- Título 3 de la parte 2 del Libro 2 del [Decreto 1067 de 2015](#)



**Graph 01.** Procedure for determining refugee status

However, there are still barriers for these people who, after having transited through a second country, seek international protection in Colombia. Added to the above, there has been **disincentive to use the Refugee figure prioritizing the Temporary Protection Permit - PPT, since the institutions have been emphatic in offering the PPT** when assisting people, instead of fully explaining the refugee process in the country.

On the other hand, the type R visa began to be implemented making use of the Temporary Protection Statute for Venezuelan Migrants, which grants residence to all those Venezuelans who previously had a Special Permanence Permit - PEP and now have a PPT and have a 5-year period to stay the country. However, there are still barriers to accessing this document due to its high cost (455.25 USD). Given this, it is important to note that, although the transition from PPT to the R Visa is possible, this process may not be adopted due to the cost of the procedure. Additionally, there continue to be barriers to the acknowledgment of forced migration caused by displacement, as well as in the continuity in the trajectory of each migrant.

On the other hand, in **Peru**, the Refugee Law of 2002 establishes that people can seek international protection under the Geneva Convention of 1951 and the Cartagena Declaration of 1984, however **in practice, it has been seen that the only applications that are assessed - and in some cases acknowledged - are those that are considered as part of the 1951 Geneva Convention**. This is one of the main protection gaps in Peru, since a large number of people seeking international protection have been excluded, thus their realities and circumstances are not acknowledged, and their rights are not guaranteed.

Though, the profile of **Venezuelans has not been included under international protection**, as - in the majority of cases - the reasons why they left their country do not comply with those provided for in the 1951 Geneva Convention. This has led to the **development other alternatives for immigration regularization** such as the Humanitarian Immigration Quality, designed exclusively for refugee applicants without the aforementioned profile. There are other temporary or resident immigration statuses that have emerged as a way to regularize the immigration situation of Venezuelans or other foreign populations:

- **The Humanitarian Migratory Status:** Since the publication of the guidelines for granting humanitarian migratory status in June 2021, this migratory status was granted to people seeking refuge but are not included in the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees. To date, there is an issue with those who have this immigration status, since -it is granted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the procedure for delivering the immigration card is administered by the National Superintendence of Migration - SNM - and there is a very slow communication between both institutions. This has generated inconveniences, mainly for those who have an expired residence, because although they have the legal document issued by Foreign Relations, this is not reflected in the public system of the SNM: since the extension has not been registered there, the person appears to third parties (public and private) as if it had an expired residence permit, which leads to -for example- being unable to renew an employment contract, being unable to sign other legal documents in the country, problems opening bank accounts, among others.



- **The Temporary Permanence Permit - TPP:** This initiative, which was in effect from January 23 to October 31, 2018, attempted to regulate the group of Venezuelan people who arrived in the country and entered regularly as tourists, granting them one year of regular stay. However, this temporary permit did not have the characteristic of a resident immigration status, which grants an immigration card. In this sense, it was a palliative measure that, later, had a more positive effect with the granting of special resident immigration status to anyone who had previously obtained the PTP.
- **The special resident immigration status:** Once the first TPP reached the expiration date, people had to make a change in immigration status to access the special resident immigration status and - with this - have an immigration card. This immigration status remains in force, as long as an extension of residence is carried out annually. The National Immigration Superintendence did not inform in a timely manner that this procedure had to be carried out and, in addition, the physical document called "immigration card" had a four-year validity date printed on it. The latter led to confusion among people, as they interpreted the four years recorded in the physical document as the period of validity of their residence.
- **The humanitarian visa:** Since -August 2017- the suspension of Venezuela from MERCOSUR was ordered on December 2, 2016, it was within the power of the Peruvian state to regulate the entry of Venezuelans into the country. Thus, Superintendency Resolution No. 000177 Wednesday, June 12, 2019, issued on June 12, 2019, established that, for immigration control of the entrance into the national territory, people of Venezuelan nationality must have a passport and corresponding visa, processed by a Peruvian Consular Office. This motivated many people of this nationality to enter irregularly, that is, without passing through immigration controls. This fact has been occurring to this day, in which the incoming flow of this population has been maintained.
- **The Temporary Permanence Permit Card - TPC:** Through Supreme Decree No. 010-2020-IN, an exceptional measure was approved to regularize the immigration status of foreigners who were in an irregular situation until October 22, 2020. The opportunity to begin the immigration regularization process and obtain the TPC was extended until April 1, 2023. However, the deadline on which the group of people in an irregular immigration situation could access this procedure never changed. Likewise, as happened with the TPP, the TPC does not represent a complete scope like an immigration card and - what is worse - unlike the TPP, so far it does not allow access to a special resident immigration status.

In **Mexico**, there is a big protection gap as **the only way for a migratory regularization is to seek a Refugee status**, this has saturated the system created to grant this protection. In 2017, the Mexican government implemented the Migration Regularization Temporal Program (MRTP), but it did not have the impact that it required as the population was not informed about it, thus it did not consolidate in a timely manner. **In Mexico, the cause of generalized violence established in the Declaration of Cartagena is not considered a valid reason for approval of the Refugee status**; it is only considered when violence was inflicted by maras, political motives and/or crimes, leaving the assessment to the discretion of the interviewers. Furthermore, Gender Based Violence (GBV) is not considered a main reason for seeking asylum; in this sense if the person fled just for this cause, the request shall not be processed.

**Mexico is one of the most impacted countries after the termination of Article 42, the renewal of Article 8 and the condition of seeking asylum in all the territory before reaching the United States.** The first effect has been the decrease of refugee requests in Mexico, followed by the increase in migration controls-previously mentioned-, the increase in the number of people waiting at the border to enter the United States<sup>20</sup>, amongst others. Moreover, the Mexicans that move to the United States seeking international protection are not being acknowledged under this right; although as part of the CBPOne application the Mexican population may apply, the number of people accepted is lower than the ones applying, failing to protect the people that are fleeing their countries and putting their lives at stake if they are denied access.

As observed, the diversity of regularization forms that have been developed in the countries above have not been enough to guarantee the protection and the access to rights of refugees, migrants and forcefully displaced people of different nationalities that are in the territory. This shows there are big gaps that should alert the States of Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia; Mexico which are obliged to protect them.

## **5 Guarantee of rights of girls, boys, and adolescents refugee children, migrants, and internally displaced persons, especially unaccompanied minors, and the institutional response in the region**

The protection of migrant, refugee and internally displaced girls, boys and adolescents must be considered a key element within the regulations of the countries of the region. However, it has been evident in the region that children and adolescents continue to be unprotected, especially due to the relationship between regularization processes and the possibility of their rights being fully guaranteed. Likewise, **this is one of the groups that has endured the most violence on the migratory pathways of the Americas.**

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<sup>20</sup> More information at: <https://www.animalpolitico.com/analisis/organizaciones/en-todo-amar-y-servir/que-sigue-despues-del-titulo-42>

One of the first regional challenges is the **acknowledgment of the immigration status and its corresponding international protection**, which has effects on access and guarantee of other rights. An example of this is that unaccompanied girls, boys, and adolescents experience great obstacles to seeking international protection, given that **the causes of their migration are not recognized either within the Cartagena Declaration or by the Geneva Convention**. (Paris Pombo, 2022). This population is subject to challenges when submitting their asylum request in Mexico or the United States, not only for the lack legal and material support, but also the lack of clear and differentiated routes to promptly address these cases. This has meant that many of them endure **violation of rights in detention centers for migrants or they are returned to their country of origin**, despite the fact that the risks and violence that motivate their departure persist.

In the case of **Ecuador**, girls, boys, and adolescents accompanied by one of the parents face barriers in their regularization process: the father or mother must have a **special power or parental authority of the minor to be able to complete the regularization process**. On the other hand, in earlier times, the Venezuelan Consulate used to deliver the Single Data Registry, which was considered as equivalent to an identity document that could be submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility of Ecuador. Currently, the Consulate is no longer issuing it, creating another challenge for the regularization process.

Added to this is the **high price of the Venezuelan passport**, which makes it impossible for many people to access this document. This is a necessary requirement for the regularization process in Ecuador and for some processes in the educational system. Furthermore, it is necessary to mention that there are cases where applications for International Protection have been denied, which is why people file appeals or reviews. Since this process takes a long time, many people opt for other regularization alternatives, but find a dead end, **given that in the internal system of the Chancellery -ISIGEX- they are registered as refugee applicants, and this does not allow them to apply to another immigration status**. With regard to the protection of unaccompanied or separated children and adolescents, it should be noted that in Ecuador there is a rule that allows their regularization process: “Care procedure for girls, boys, adolescents and their families in forced displaced contexts in Ecuador” of the Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry.

In **Colombia**, with the new implementation of the form for the refugee status determination procedure **many access processes that grant shelter for children may be affected**, since this form is not easy to understand by children, and there are also difficulties in the inclusion of minors as beneficiaries. Besides, **in regions like Buenaventura, the number of minors at risk of statelessness persists**, derived from the inefficiency of the State in not acknowledging midwives from ethnic groups as people who can certify births and - consequently - they cannot register in the civil registry as there is no clear evidence to prove they were born in the country.

In **Peru**, the gap in access to documentation for children and adolescents is due to the fact that **it is not a prioritized population group for the regularization of their immigration status**. Therefore, the only options to access documentary regularization are special immigration qualities: the special resident migratory status and the migratory status for training purposes. The special resident immigration status can be granted in a situation of

lack of protection for a child or when they are unaccompanied. Likewise, immigration status for training purposes is given to those who are studying. However, it is important to warn that there are no other clear routes to guarantee the protection of the rights of minors.

These processes of regularization of girls, boys and adolescents in the region have led to **difficulties to access, remain or be promoted in educational institutions**. In **Venezuela**, refugee, migrant and internally displaced children and adolescents have -formally- access to human rights in all areas, but there is an obstacle in the documentation regarding the right to education, because the daughters and sons of people in this situation **They do not have the formal documents issued by the Venezuelan State that allow the corresponding accreditation or certification**. This has prevented them from continuing their formal studies in Venezuela due to this obstacle.

In **Ecuador**, adolescents who are in their last school year and who are in an irregular immigration situation are **required a passport to be granted the document that certifies study completion**. Many times, these people do not have this document or any other identification document, which hinders the guarantee of their right to education.

In **Colombia** as demonstrated by the “Fronteras de Papel” report, there are currently no formal barriers for Venezuelan children and adolescents access education, nor for access to regularization. However, there are some **material obstacles** in the rights of minors, such as the same **decentralization of the State, which makes an effective redistribution of rights in rural contexts impossible**. In **Peru**, access to education for children and adolescents is another challenge, since **there are no vacancies available in educational institutions**, despite the fact that the Peruvian state does not require that children and adolescents submit any type of documentation to access the Peruvian educational system. Those who are already part of an educational institution must face the **challenge of xenophobia, bullying and discrimination**.

As for the **violence that children and adolescents have experienced in the region** it is important to highlight those **related to armed conflict**. In the **Colombian case**, this situation is even more alarming, considering that the State only allows access to the Single Registry of Victims to migrants who have a valid document to be in the country, as well as proof that indicates that at the time of the victimizing event they were in the country. This situation has generated obstacles in the access to the rights of minors when they are subjected to this type of victimizing procedures.

Finally, given the risks experienced by accompanied and unaccompanied girls, boys, and adolescents in migratory stations in **Mexico, a lawsuit to guarantee their stay in more protective spaces**, was won, which meant they get to stay in spaces with more guarantees. However, there have been reports of **detentions of minors in immigration stations**. The sum of all these circumstances generates great alarm regarding the realities that children and adolescents experience in the Latin America and the Caribbean region.



## Guarantee of human rights to trans-border Indigenous communities

Although Latin America and the Caribbean has made significant progress in protecting the rights of indigenous peoples and nationalities, in recent years, the **blend of migratory processes and the historical movements of these communities has generated a challenge for their protection by the States of the region**, since these movements are not deemed from the worldview of the ancestral peoples, but from a **state-centric view that limits mobility between states**.

This is seen, for example, in **Colombia** with the Indigenous communities **Yukpa** and **Eñapa**, that **have not been recognized as “binational” communities** from Colombia and Venezuela. Although the Colombian Political Constitution contemplates the right to nationality for binational peoples, the reality is that Colombia has not ratified any agreement with another country that facilitates the procedure. This situation has made access and recognition of the right to nationality an even more cumbersome and uncertain process. Even though binational peoples should obtain such recognition, in practice they **have chosen procedures such as the Temporary Protection Permit**, which allows them to access the offer of rights in the Colombian State, going against the protection of their rights as ancestral communities.

The situation also becomes complex regarding the **information and completion of nationality and immigration regularization procedures**. Currently, these procedures are written and explained in Spanish, a language that not all binational communities use. On the other hand, within the communities accompanied in Colombia, inadequate procedures have been identified by institutional authorities to explain the different instruments and mechanisms, which has made effective access to said instruments by the population impossible.

In **Peru** there are regulations regarding Indigenous peoples. However, there are challenges in its application. In this sense, the main barriers are in:

- **Education:** At the primary and secondary level there are few bilingual schools in each of the communities. There are few people from Indigenous communities who manage to pursue higher education due to limited geographic access and incentives to pursue studies.
- **Territory:** The communities are in constant struggle to defend their territories against the scourges of drug trafficking, land traffickers and extractive activities that put them at risk.
- **Health:** Some communities have health posts, but medical personnel are limited in the face of great needs.

In **Venezuela** there is the Ministry of Popular Power for Indigenous Peoples, a body that promotes the strengthening of Indigenous communities in the country. However, many Indigenous peoples claim to live in abandonment by the Venezuelan State. It is important to highlight that in Venezuelan territory there are diverse **“binational” peoples** which, as in the Colombian case, **they have not found easy access to the recognition of their nationalities.**

The Indigenous community **Wayuu**, located between Venezuela and Colombia, have free transit between both countries, but when seeking health care, they seek support in Colombia, due to the lack of supplies and care in Venezuelan health centers.

The Indigenous community **Yukpa** located in the **State of Zulia, in Venezuela**, has been displaced from their territories to guarantee access to food and medical care. They have arrived at urban areas from the Sierra de Perijá, a place where they live alongside the Indigenous ethnic group **Añú**, and they have also settled in areas of the department of Norte de Santander, in Colombia.

Like the Yukpa people, members of the **Warao** and **Yanomami**, in the southern part of the country, **have moved to Brazil**, specifically to the state of Roraima, for the reasons mentioned above.

In **Mexico** groups of **Indigenous cross-border agricultural workers** who have been accompanied by the JRS office in Comalapa (southern border), as they have experienced **lack of protection of human rights due to violence in the area, forced recruitment and forced disappearances.** This has limited their mobility due to work issues. On the other hand, the case of the Indigenous group **Mizquitos** -from Honduras- who are arriving in Mexico<sup>21</sup> and have left their territory due to the violence inflicted by criminal groups, due to climatic factors that are affecting their territory - such as floods and fires - and due to the lack of opportunities to have a decent life. Although there is no exact record of what these people are experiencing, it is important to warn about the lack of protection of rights that is being evident **not having differential actions from an intercultural perspective to accompany and protect them.**

On the other hand, at the **Colombian-Ecuadorian border**, Indigenous communities have been internally displaced due to oil exploitation and the effects on the environment, which they consider their home and an essential part of their worldview. Faced with this, they have been forced to move towards the borders, where the lack of a clear policy has led to **decontextualized responses that ignore their ethnic identity.**

In the town community **Awá** -which is located on the Ecuadorian side of the border- one of the problems is the presence of **informal mining**, administered by groups associated with drug trafficking. Mining agents outside the law promote a precarious economy, offering families jobs such as cutting down forests and opening roads; but not all families are considered, which **generates internal conflicts and the breakdown of the social and political fabric.** This prevents an adequate good organizational management for the

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<sup>21</sup>More information at: <https://process.hn/comunidades-vacias-retratan-migracion-de-indigenas-de-honduras/>

defense of their territories. These complexities are deepened for geographical reasons, since where these communities are located, the terrain does not allow easy entry and, in addition, they are controlled by irregular armed groups.

Regarding the community **Éperara Siapidaara**, which is located in Ecuador, the small size of its territory has been subject to **invasion threats** by the settler population. In addition, they have high rates of poverty due to institutional abandonment, which is seen in lack of basic services, quality and access to education, pollution of the main river, a space for women interaction.

There are many Éperara Siapidaara people, originally from Colombia, who have the expectation of acquiring the Ecuadorian nationality because they are “binational” people, however the Éperara Siapidaara leadership considers that they are vulnerable ethnic minority group, not considered by the State.

**The protection of Indigenous peoples - and their own leaders - is also limited.** The vulnerability they experience increases in the face of continuous threats due to the defense of their territories. In this situation, **States have not provided the corresponding protection measures to all people.** These findings and others related to Indigenous communities in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru can be explored on the microsite “Vidas y territorios en movimiento. Resistencia de diez comunidades indígenas en Colombia, Ecuador, y Perú”: <https://lac.jrs.net/vidasyterritorios/>

## 7 Opportunities for reconciliation and hospitality

The regional panorama around refugees, migrants, and internally displaced people extends beyond the challenges; **there are opportunities that must be considered so to create regional strategies for lasting solutions.** At JRS we understand reconciliation as an option to “reunite what was broken”, aimed at the **promotion of fair relationships** at the people and community level that were fragmented by violence and forced displacement, and with the JRS and Encuentros SJM Peru teams, so that their **life projects are developed within a framework of hospitality, respect, dignity and guarantees of rights**; generating political, social, cultural, environmental and spiritual conditions that promote the culture of encounter and help overcome cycles of violence.

In light of this, this section presents various reconciliation and hospitality initiatives that can guide some of the regional strategies mentioned. First of all, the **reconciliation network created in the La Vega neighborhood in the city of Caracas, Venezuela**, where preventive reconciliation has facilitated community transformation from women, especially in the face of the high polarization that is happening in this country. The Andrés Bello Catholic University, the Santa Inés Health Center, the Educational Network, community leaders, soup kitchen leaders, and the Parish have converged in this reconciliation network. To learn more about this experience and other reconciliation experiences in the region, we invite you to visit the “Reconciliation-es” microsite: <https://lac.jrs.net/reconciliaciones/>

Furthermore, in the **JRS local offices in Venezuela - Caracas Centro, Táchira, and Zulia - workshops have been implemented in host communities** on hospitality in human mobility processes, culture of peace, conflict resolution and reconciliation. Recreational spaces have also been created, like a cultural caravan, to promote hospitality through art. The JRS office in Táchira works in alliance with the Department of Art and Culture of the Catholic University of Táchira.

For its part, the **Cultural Caravan for Hospitality, promoted by the Jesuit Network with Migrants, has been accompanied by JRS Venezuela** as it passed through the country, visiting the border states of Táchira, Apure, Zulia, and the city of Caracas with the purpose of bringing a message of hope, hospitality, reconciliation and strengthening the teams' capacities in these topics and experiences.

In **Ecuador**, this has been done through **psychological workshops** focused on reconciliation and hospitality with the host population. In the Province of Carchi, through the **rights protection workshops** for the National Police, it was possible to raise awareness and approach police officers so that they respect and promote respect for the rights of the population in situations of forced human mobility.

In a similar way to what was done in Tapachula, in **Ecuador** spaces called **“sorority groups”** that work with migrant, refugee, internally displaced women and reception and host communities to promote awareness and integration by addressing issues and experiences of a culture of peace and reconciliation.

In **Perú** the Encuentros SJM Perú team did the **Hospitality Caravan**: the journey was through Lima and Piura to promote the culture of welcome and encounter between the Encuentros teams and to strengthen support for migrants, refugees, and internally displaced people.

In **Mexico**, specifically on the northern border, the **JRS territorial team in Ciudad Juárez has accompanied the families and survivors of the people who died in the fire inside the immigration detention center in March**, seeking to accompany the process of healing wounds, seek truth and - if they want it - psychosocial support and legal help to seek recognition under the Humanitarian Parole in the United States.

In **Tapachula** activities have been developed focused on **meetings, information, and cultural diversity**, making visible the presence of refugees and asylum seekers in the region and the opportunity of **building with them a fairer society**. These meetings also aim to strengthen relations with authorities and civil society.

There have also been **actions to take care of mother earth** strengthening the joint work between migrants, refugees, and residents by cleaning the beaches near the city. Likewise, the **Mia project** which aims to build networks, entrepreneurship, and integration with principles of sisterhood between impoverished Mexican women and migrant and refugee women.



In **Colombia tools for reconciliation have been developed**<sup>22</sup> in the territories, as well as the implementation of **Hospitality Caravans**, which seek to provide information and facilitate the appropriation of diverse experiences in the communities. These Caravans have been held in Magdalena Medio, Norte de Santander, Nariño, Soacha and Ibagué.

Finally, we are aware that the region and those who travel through it require us to deepen and **learn from their reconciliatory and hospitable experiences**. For this reason, the promotion of spaces for learning and reflection around reconciliation, where various organizations and works of the Society of Jesus, other civil society organizations and - especially - organizations of migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons and people participate. In these situations, those who have accompanied reconciliatory and hospitable initiatives, becoming **encounters, living together and communion teachers**.

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<sup>22</sup>To delve deeper into these tools: <https://col.jrs.net/es/herramientas-pedagogicas/>

## 8 Publications about the context of each country:

To learn more about regional and country realities, the following published documents are available:

### Colombia:

1. Ciudadanía cancelada, derechos arrebatados
2. Fronteras de papel
3. Estrategia de incidencia para la garantía del derecho a la educación de niños, niñas y adolescentes venezolanos (as) no escolarizados: en el área metropolitana de Bucaramanga – Santander

### México:

1. Guía de búsqueda de migrantes desaparecidos
2. Informe del ejercicio de caracterización del desplazamiento interno en Chihuahua 2023

### Perú:

1. Diagnóstico situación población venezolana y condición educativa de niños, niñas y adolescentes en la frontera sur del Perú
2. La respuesta estatal a los desafíos de regularización y la atención de la salud mental
3. Ser venezolano/a en el Perú: un acercamiento a la respuesta del Estado peruano
4. Evaluación rápida de las necesidades de protección en Tacna, Perú (abril, 2023)

### Latino América y El Caribe:

1. Vidas y territorios en Movimiento
2. Monitoreos humanitarios fronterizos Arauca



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